The escalating conflict involving Iran is doing more than rattling global oil markets. It is exposing the fragility of Africa’s food systems and the continent’s dangerous dependence on imported agricultural inputs. As tensions disrupt trade routes around the Strait of Hormuz – one of the world’s most critical shipping corridors for energy and fertiliser exports – fertiliser prices are rising sharply again, placing fresh pressure on African farmers already battling climate shocks, rising transport costs and declining soil fertility. For Africa, this is not just another global commodity story. It is a direct threat to food production, household incomes and economic stability.
The Middle East remains central to global fertiliser production, particularly ammonia and urea, which are essential for modern agriculture. As tensions linked to Iran intensified, shipping insurance costs rose, freight routes became more expensive and energy prices climbed sharply, causing fertiliser markets to react almost immediately. Global urea prices have reportedly increased by between 50% and 70% in recent months, while sulphur prices used in phosphate fertilisers have surged by more than 500% in some markets due to supply disruptions and panic buying. For Africa, where more than 80% of fertiliser is imported, the consequences are especially severe because these global shocks quickly translate into higher production costs for farmers and eventually higher food prices for consumers.
The timing could hardly be worse. Across the continent, farmers are already operating under immense pressure as climate change disrupts rainfall patterns, droughts become more frequent and local currencies weaken sharply against the dollar, making imported inputs even more expensive. In Uganda, where agriculture employs roughly 70% of the population directly or indirectly, the pressure is already becoming visible. Productivity remains constrained by low mechanisation, declining soil fertility and limited use of modern farm inputs, while many smallholder farmers in districts such as Mbale, Masindi, Lira and Gulu were already struggling to afford fertiliser for maize, coffee and rice production even before the latest global price increases.
Now, many farmers are reducing acreage, applying smaller quantities of fertiliser than recommended or abandoning fertiliser use altogether and hoping good rains compensate for declining soil nutrients. Yet agriculture offers little room for compromise. Across Africa, fertiliser application averages roughly 18 kilograms per hectare compared to a global average of more than 130 kilograms, a gap that partly explains why agricultural yields across the continent remain significantly lower than in Asia and other emerging regions. Many African soils have been cultivated continuously for decades with limited nutrient replenishment, leaving them heavily degraded and increasingly dependent on fertiliser to sustain productivity.
Without adequate fertiliser use, yields decline quickly. For a Ugandan maize farmer, a harvest that would normally produce 20 bags per acre may now produce only 10 or 12 after reducing fertiliser application. Across millions of farms, those declines gradually become national food supply problems that tighten markets and push food prices higher. This is where the fertiliser crisis becomes more than an agricultural issue because in many African countries households already spend more than 40% of their income on food. Rising fertiliser prices therefore feed directly into the cost of maize flour, bread, rice, cooking oil and other staples consumed daily across African households.
For many urban families in Kampala, Nairobi or Lusaka, food inflation is not an abstract economic statistic discussed in policy reports. It means buying smaller quantities of food, skipping meals or sacrificing other essentials such as school fees and healthcare. Higher food prices also increase inflationary pressure across economies, weaken purchasing power and place governments under growing political pressure. Countries already burdened by debt and fiscal constraints may struggle to sustain fertiliser subsidies or food import programmes, while fragile states such as Sudan face an even greater risk as conflict and rising agricultural input costs combine to worsen hunger and instability.
The deeper concern, however, is structural. Africa possesses enormous agricultural potential alongside natural gas reserves in countries such as Nigeria and Algeria that are essential for fertiliser production, while Morocco holds some of the world’s largest phosphate deposits. Yet despite these advantages, much of Africa still relies heavily on imported fertiliser and fragile international supply chains, leaving the continent exposed to every global disruption, whether wars, pandemics, shipping crises or energy shocks happening thousands of kilometres away. The Iran conflict is simply the latest reminder that Africa continues importing not just fertiliser, but vulnerability itself.
The current crisis should force policymakers to rethink the continent’s agricultural strategy more fundamentally. Short-term subsidies alone will not solve the problem. Africa needs long-term investment in local fertiliser manufacturing and regional supply chains capable of insulating farmers from global volatility. Governments also need smarter and more targeted subsidy systems because in many countries fertiliser subsidies are expensive, politically driven and poorly administered, often benefiting traders and middlemen more than productive smallholder farmers. At the same time, African countries must invest more aggressively in soil health, irrigation, extension services and climate-smart agriculture to reduce excessive dependence on imported fertiliser while improving long-term productivity and resilience.
Most importantly, African governments must stop treating food security as merely a seasonal agricultural issue because it is increasingly tied to inflation, economic stability and national resilience. Behind the statistics are millions of ordinary Africans trying to navigate another difficult season – a farmer in eastern Uganda choosing between fertiliser and school fees, a mother in Kampala paying more for maize flour, or a rural family hoping smaller harvests will still carry them through the year. Wars may begin far from Africa’s farms, but increasingly, their consequences are ending up on African dinner tables.
Mr. Were is a Senior Operations Officer at the World Bank Group based in South Africa.
Email. were.nathan@gmail.com
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank Group.
