A national airline is more than a commercial venture. It is a symbol of connectivity, ambition, and state capacity. When an airline struggles, public debate often gravitates toward fuel costs, aircraft availability, or market competition. Yet aviation history tells us something more uncomfortable: airlines rarely fail in the sky. They fail in the boardroom.
Uganda’s airline challenges, most visibly associated with Uganda Airlines, invite a deeper question: are these difficulties fundamentally a failure of corporate governance?
Airlines are among the most complex organisations to govern. They are capital-intensive, heavily regulated, operationally unforgiving, and permanently exposed to currency risk, fuel volatility, and reputational shocks. In such an environment, strong governance is not a “nice to have”; it is the difference between survival and slow decline.
The first governance fault line is Board competence versus Board composition. A Board may be well-intentioned yet ill-equipped. Aviation demands specialised oversight—fleet strategy, leasing structures, route economics, safety regulation, and risk financing. When Boards are constituted primarily for representational balance rather than domain competence, management is left without informed challenge, and strategic blind spots emerge.
Second is role confusion between shareholder, Board, and management. In state-linked enterprises, this is often the most lethal weakness. When shareholders stray into operational decision-making, Boards lose authority. When Boards micromanage, management loses agility. And when no one is clearly accountable, underperformance becomes chronic rather than exceptional.
Third is strategy inconsistency. Frequent route changes, shifting market focus, or unclear growth horizons are rarely management failures alone. They often signal a Board that has not settled on a coherent risk appetite or long-term strategic intent. Airlines cannot be governed on electoral or budget cycles; they require disciplined, multi-year commitments grounded in commercial logic.
Fourth is weak risk governance. Airlines live and die by their exposure to fuel prices, foreign exchange movements, maintenance cycles, and aircraft utilisation. These are not technical details to be “noted” in Board packs. They require active oversight, scenario planning, and early intervention. Where risk committees are passive or advisory in name only, shocks quickly turn existential.
2026 Rewriting Goals Over RegretsFifth, and perhaps most telling, is performance management without consequences. Persistent losses, operational disruptions, or strategic drift should trigger governance responses: leadership reviews, Board refreshment, or strategic reset. When outcomes stagnate, but accountability remains vague, the problem is no longer commercial. It is structural.
Across Africa and beyond, airlines that have stabilised did so only after confronting governance truths. Boards were reconstituted, mandates clarified, and hard decisions taken—often insulated from short-term political pressure. Those that relied solely on capital injections without governance reform merely postponed the reckoning.
The uncomfortable reality is this: bailouts do not fix governance gaps. They only delay their exposure.
This is not an argument against national airlines, nor a dismissal of their strategic value. It is an argument for governing them as the complex, high-risk enterprises they are. That means aviation-literate Boards, clear separation of roles, disciplined strategy execution, robust risk oversight, and transparent accountability.
If Uganda’s airline ambitions are to endure, the conversation must move beyond turbulence and toward governance. Because in aviation—as in leadership—the most dangerous failures are rarely dramatic. They are silent, structural, and allowed to persist.
The Writer is Max Manzi, Chartered Governance Professional & Advocate.
